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W. Robert Thomas

A student of law and philosophy.

Profile

Will Thomas

Graduate Student, The University of Michigan
Research | Greater Detroit Area, US

Experience

  • Aug 2008 - Present

    Graduate Student / University of Michigan

    I am pursuing concurrent degrees in philosophy and law. My areas of interest include philosophy of law, normative ethics and applied ethics.
  • Jun 2008 - Jul 2008

    Front Page Editor / TPM Media

  • Nov 2007 - Jun 2008

    Associate Political Editor, Political Reporter / The Huffington Post

    I manage and promote original and breaking content for the Huffington Post's political page.
  • Feb 2007 - Nov 2007

    Researcher / TPM Media

Education

  • 2008 - 2014

    University of Michigan

    PhD in Philosophy
  • 2009 - 2011

    University of Michigan Law School

    J.D. in Law
  • 2002 - 2006

    Columbia University in the City of New York

    Philosophy, Economics
    Activities: Columbia Organization of Rising Entrepreneurs

Additional information

Websites:

Posts

  • May 22, 12:00 PM

    Top 10 Privacy Tweaks You Should Know About [Lifehacker Top 10]

    With all the talk lately about Facebook's flawed privacy systems, it's a good time to consider what you're making available elsewhere on the web and on your system. These 10 settings tweaks and setups make your web life a little less public.

    Photo by Jorge Franganillo.

    Note: The most basic means of boosting your privacy in any computer system is encrypting your data, but that's more of a system setup than a slight change to your usual setup. Still, it's worth looking into if you've got files for your eyes only.

    10. Run a Background Check on Yourself to Know What's Out There

    It takes only a few seconds to know what Google knows about you, but there are many, many other avenues into your past and present on the web. Want to know more about what a potential employer can know? Consumer action blog Consumerist has a nicely comprehensive list of background check tools to try out. You shouldn't try and run them all, but at least get a feel for what can be known about you with just a few clicks. Photo by omk_489. (Original post)

    9. Skip Incognito/Private Browsing and Really Leave No Trace

    Private browsing modes might prevent your coworkers or roommates from seeing where you wander on the web, but you still leave plenty of traces for someone who knows where to look. Take the How-To Geek's advice and really browse without leaving a trace. Wipe away Flash cookies, clean out DNS caches, and automate your system so every boot-up is a fresh start.

    8. Pick Better Security Questions

    Some security questions and password recovery schemes offered by webapps are so bad, anyone with your casual acquaintance and a small amount of Google savvy could poke into your email whenever they felt like it. To get around weak security questions, use blogger danah boyd's security question algorithm. Instead of straight-up providing your mother's maiden name, use a scheme, such as "[Snarky Bad Attitude Phrase] + [Core Noun Phrase] + [Unique Word]," so that your answer becomes "StupidQuestion MiddleName Booyah," substituting "MiddleName" for the actual answer. If you're lucky enough to be able to choose your own security questions, Lifehacker reader James has written about the best kinds of questions at his blog. (Original posts: memorable answers, good questions).

    7. Set Up BitTorrent for Private Downloading

    BitTorrent is a public commons of file sharing, and that means that all kinds of folks interested in, say, what your home IP address is, and what you're downloading, can dig into it. With both a proxy and settings in your favorite torrent app, you can protect your privacy when downloading. Nothing's foolproof, but a few checkboxes and a different downloading path can do a lot to give you great peace of mind.

    6. Know Your Google Settings

    If you're anything like us, or most of our readers, you've got a lot of your life floating around in Google's cloud-based apps. It pays, then, to know how to set what Google shares publicly about you, how much of your search history is being saved, and how to back up your data so you've always got your own copy. These are among the 10 Google settings you should know about that center on privacy and data retention, though it's always a good idea to know the parameters of the spaces you share your data in.

    5. Know How to Travel Without Being Spied On

    Just because some countries have widespread net access doesn't mean it's an open and private web. It's often meant to deter dissidents in strong-handed regimes, but why take the chance of letting your web data fall into the wrong hands? One Lifehacker reader, wishing to remain anonymous and in a non-specific region, crafted a survival guide for traveling where privacy isn't respected. Using secure Gmail, carrying two cloned USB sticks, relying on KeePass and TrueCrypt for passwords and encryption, and knowing how to send data over the web without having it looked at are all good skills to have, both for traveling and in general. Image a composite of photos by hemmob and nolifebeforecofee

    4. Know Where You Stand With Facebook at a Glance

    Facebook has promised "simplistic" privacy settings coming soon, but in the meantime, knowing exactly what you've offered to share or keep private is far from transparent. One very crafty hacker at ReclaimPrivacy has put together a settings-scanning bookmarklet that shows what you're sharing beyond your social circle, and offers links and automatic fixes for those settings. Another coder, Ka-Ping Yee, offers a site that shows what the public web can see on Facebook, some of which you can then remove. They're both excellent eye-openers, both for your own account and for friends who refuse to consider what's being shown out there. (Original posts: ReclaimPrivacy bookmarklet, Facebook public).

    3. Run Your Browser Through a Proxy

    It's not something you'll want to do all the time, but once in a while, you might want to hide your online tracks. To do so, you can use the go-to web randomization tool, TOR, which has tools available for nearly every OS and browser. For a DIY solution that can work from any browser, we've detailed installing the free PHProxy tool on your home computer or hosted web space to get around restrictions and slightly disguise your tracks. You could also run a proxy through Google's App Engine, and go the full-tilt geek route of encrypting your browsing with an SSH SOCKS proxy. Any way you choose, it's a smart skill to have handy for dodgy connections and restrictive networks.

    2. Better Protect Your Mint.com or Other Financial Accounts

    The thing that makes Mint.com such a convenient one-stop shop for financial data and budgeting also makes it a gold mine for anyone looking to learn more about you, or know which accounts they could try to jump into. Security professional Jason Owens provides some smart tips on better protecting your Mint.com account that can apply to any site where you manage your financials. Key among them—don't use your regular email address. Set up a new email address you don't tell anyone about as your login/password verification address. You can forward its mail to your main email, sure, but if someone compromises your email, don't make it too too easy for them to get a hold on your finances.

    1. Stay Available on Facebook Without Really Being In It

    You might have considered quitting Facebook, but stopped short because it's how a few far-flung friends and relatives stay in touch, or a place those without your email address can ping you. We can understand, and, luckily, have a halfway solution to recommend. Quit Facebook without really quitting, as Whitson did. Create a new account, linked to a different email, and set it up so that your old friends are still there, but Facebook, even at its most Draconian, can't really reveal all that much about you, and your friends can't really overshare without your permission.


    What steps have you taken recently to bolster your own web or desktop privacy? What would you like to fix, but need some pointers on doing so? Let's hash it all out in the comments.

  • May 20, 01:52 PM

    Poseur Alert

    Shared by Will
    Definitiely time for a Nic Cage mid- (quarter?-) career retrospective. Top pics: The Rock, Raising Arizona, Face Off (obvs) and maybe The Wicker Man. Look for it in July.
    “I love all animals. I have a fascination with fish, birds, whales—sentient life—insects, reptiles. I actually choose the way I eat according to the way animals have sex. I think fish are very dignified with sex. So are birds. But pigs, not so much. So I don’t eat pig meat or things like that. I eat fish and fowl," - Nicholas Cage.


    Definitiely time for a Nic Cage mid- (quarter?-) career retrospective. Top pics: The Rock, Raising Arizona, Face Off (obvs) and maybe The Wicker Man. Look for it in July.
  • May 20, 01:45 PM

    The problem of Senate floor time

    As you know by now, the FinReg bill is getting squeezed by the need to move a war supplemental and an extension of unemployment insurance next week. But it's worth taking this problem out of the context of this or that issue and just putting it on its own terms. The Senate does a lot more now than it did, say, 100 years ago. The country is bigger and more complex and there are more committees and constituencies and issues. But the Senate itself is not larger than it was in 1910, and its days have not become much longer, and the advent of air travel has made it easier for senators to head home for the weekend and so, if anything, senators spend less time in Washington than they used to.

    All this creates a time crunch. Most of us only tune in for occasional big bills, but the Senate is responsible for all manner of nominations and appropriations and budgets that have to be passed even if there's no real time to pass them. And when you have lots of things to do and not that much time to do it, you can't spend enough time on each individual thing.

    People normally take this as an argument that the Senate should work more. As it is, the average week is about three days long. But politicians are wise to our game on this: We want them to work more, but then we get really upset if it turns out they're not spending enough days back home and we elect the guy who keeps telling us about how he'll be back home every week no matter what. So that's what we've got, and the politicians can't work longer weeks until we decide to stop punishing them for spending a lot of time doing their job.

    It seems that the obvious thing to do would be to take committees more seriously: There's not enough time to do everything on the Senate floor, but if people really trusted the committees and just gave their products a quick up-or-down vote, that would speed things along nicely. The problem there is that senators want to make changes to bills that didn't come from committees they served on. One way to handle this would be for them to vote against the bill and relay their concerns to the committee, which could then decide whether to deal with addressing them if the bill lost. But no one seems to want to do that because it means giving up valuable power and influence.

    And then there's the question of the Senate rules: The practice of mounting routine filibusters even when you don't have the 40 votes necessary to keep filibustering slows the Senate floor to a crawl: It takes about three days to break a filibuster, and a single bill can face multiple filibusters, and so you can waste a week on a small bill that passes by 70 votes. The way to handle that would be to change the rules around filibusters, but it's not clear anyone is ready to do that, either.

    You basically have a broken Senate but no one is willing to make the compromises necessary to do something about it, which isn't, I guess, a newsflash to readers of this blog.



  • May 19, 02:23 PM

    Nobody Knows in America, Univision’s in America

    Technological change has decisively tilted the balance of power away from reporters and toward powerful politicians—Obama, like his predecessor, doesn’t need to do what the White House press corps wants, and so we’ll keep reading stories like this for a while:

    So when the president hosted a “news conference” in the Rose Garden with the visiting Mexican president on Wednesday, Mr. Reid thought maybe this time Mr. Obama would take questions. Instead, Mr. Obama allowed only a single question from the American media and called on a reporter from Univision, knowing that he would be unlikely to be asked about Tuesday’s anti-incumbent election results.

    Two points.

    One: Univision is American media. It was founded by Raul Cortez in San Antonio and its headquarters is in Miami. It’s always been an American network.

    Two: This seems like a terrible way to persuade me that Obama’s refusing to kowtow to the White House press corps is bad for the nation. According to Baker, Obama’s sin is that he called on reporters he believed were likely to ask him questions about US-Mexico relations rather than on reporters he believed were likely to ask him loaded questions about horse race politics. Well guess what—after a summit with the President of Mexico, the two Presidents should be asked questions about US-Mexico relations rather than loaded process questions about domestic horse race politics.

  • May 19, 10:44 AM

    Economic Crisis Reading List

    I alluded to this a few times yesterday, so I think I should offer my recommended readings on the Panic of 2007 and the ensuing recession. These are real recommendations, actual advice about what you should do, so things like length and readability count. Rogoff & Reinhardt have done a really praiseworthy empirical research program, but you should just look up their conclusion with Google you don’t actually need to read the book. There are also books like John Cassidy’s or Justin Fox’s that I hope do well and shift conventional wisdom but that I don’t think habitual readers of liberal blogs will necessarily learn a ton of brand new ideas from. By contrast, read these:

    — Gillian Tett Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J.P. Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe. This book has the strengths and weaknesses of excellent reporting, with the weakness being that it seems too soft on its main sources at JP Morgan. The strength is that you really get to see what investment banks were doing to create these assets. The key takeaway point that I wish were better understood is that a lot of the innovations were designed with the specific intention of exploiting regulatory loopholes.

    — Gary Gorton, Slapped By the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007. This is almost the reverse of Tett’s book—an account of why a collapse in asset prices leads to a generalized financial panic that abstracts away from all the particulars. This is important because the goal of financial regulation should be not just to avoid an exact repeat of the financial crisis but to resolve the structural features of the system that make it vulnerable to panics.

    — Raghuram Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. Here we start to shift away from the shadow banking run and the “financial crisis” to the larger macroeconomic picture. Money from Germany, Japan, China, and petrostates was exported as loans to the US and Club Med where it financed both construction and consumption of exports from Germany, Japan, China, and the petrostates. This is the cycle that the panic disrupted, leaving everyone unemployed. The global economy needs to find a way to achieve decent labor market outcomes in the developed world without this dependency on unsustainable debts.

    — Stephen Cohn and Brad DeLong The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money. This is a book about the really big picture—the fall of the US-centric neoliberal economic order, written by two people who sympathize with the project and appear to regret its passing. The upshot here is that even though reform proposals sometimes seem like efforts to (for better or for worse) just go back to how things were, this not only won’t work it actually can’t be done.

    — George Akerlof and Robert Shiller Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. I think Shiller takes this idea too far in some of his columns, but the basic idea here is to try to really take seriously the “mania”/”panic” metaphors and see that non-rational considerations (I think “irrational” is a loaded word) drive boom/bust cycles. One important thing here is that it’s easy to look back at a crisis and point to the people who called it right and say “wow, those were smart guys, we should have listened to them” but by definition bubbles occur at times when the majority and the powers that be aren’t prepared to listen to doubters.

    There have also been a lot of tick-tock narrative books about the crisis, several of which are interesting but none of which I think are particularly vital to understanding things. Michael Lewis is one of the best writers around, so his version of the crisis narrative is the most enjoyable to read.

  • May 17, 10:59 AM

    The Media Equation: Taylor Momsen Did Not Write This Headline

    Once, headlines were meant to be clever or catchy or evocative. Now they are there to get search engines to notice.

  • May 15, 12:00 PM

    Top 10 Ways to Upgrade Your Morning Routine [Lifehacker Top 10]

    Never feel like there's enough time in the morning? Find yourself struggling to get up or into work mode? We know the feeling. Try out these tips on waking up, getting energized, and getting things done in the early hours.

    Photo by DeaPeaJay.

    10. Save the Morning for Thinking

    The morning tends to have a quieter, more contemplative feel to it. Take advantage of it, as one CEO recommends, by following poet William Blake's advice to divide up your day: "Think in the morning, act in the noon, read in the evening, and sleep at night." Even if your job's more about cranking than managing and contemplating, you can use the mornings where you're not on tight deadline to think over problems, consider future challenges, and give your tasks more mindful attention than they'll get when everyone else gets in and starts grabbing for your attention. Photo by s0ulsurfing. (Original post)

    9. Track Your A.M. Habits

    Why are you always late to work or school? It's not because the Earth randomly spins faster on certain days. There's a good chance you've given yourself an arbitrary time span, like an hour, rather than see what your morning really requires. The Unclutterer blog suggests a system for tracking and streamlining your routine, and determining what wild cards can throw you off-balance. Got a rough list of necessities? Make a list, follow it, then revise it—but give yourself a couple days to see what really works for you. Yeah, it feels geeky to use a timer and spreadsheet walking around your kitchen in the morning, but once it becomes habit, you can put down the pencil and get on with life. Photo by ♥ellie♥. (Original posts: tracking, planning).

    8. Put Your Kids on an Itinerary

    You may be master of your morning, but your smaller subjects can quickly cause it to go haywire. Gretchen Rubin, blogging at The Happiness Project, suggests a deadline-oriented, precise routine for your kids to eliminate the dreaded "One more minute!" It takes some time and consistency to enforce, but soon enough, your children will be able to actually relax in the morning, if they know they're ahead of their specific breakfast/bathroom/homework-roundup routines. Photo by D Sharon Pruitt. (Original post)

    7. Eat for Better Sleep

    The simple way to realign your energy throughout your day is to eat less at night, saving the big meals for when you're up and running. If the problem is that you're just not falling asleep, plan your dinners and later snacks around foods that contribute to a good night's sleep, like turkey, bananas, honey, potatoes, almonds, and others. Photo by drumecho. (Original posts: eat light, food for sleep).

    6. Choose Your Most Important Task Over Email

    Whatever your boss sent out at 5:45 p.m. last night likely isn't as important as the most important thing you need to work on this morning. The way most of us handle our mornings, though, you wouldn't know it. If you want to look back on your morning and not feel like it disappeared, take control of your workday by prioritizing one task—just one thing you really need to do—and put off opening your inbox for one hour. Seems sacrilegious, but if you asked your boss or clients which was more important, their answer might not surprise you. Photo by chadarizona.

    5. Trade Coffee Jolts for Smaller Perk-Ups

    When it comes to caffeine, a tall cup of coffee is a sledgehammer. If you're going to use caffeine to boost your morning energy, there are real benefits to spacing out smaller caffeine boosts. A 12-ounce thermos with a 3-4 ounce mug in the lid is just about perfect, as reader jopasm tells us, as you can space out your java throughout the morning and never quite get that shaky-leg feeling. Switching to tea or diet soda, if you can stomach it, also makes for a slower-dose substitute. Photo by flash.pro. (Original post)

    4. Wake Up Without Any Caffeine

    Blogger Scott Young, waking up at 5:30 every morning, had to find a way to convince his mind and body that it was actually time to get up. He's not a caffeine person, so he relied on other cues and tactics to wake up. Filling the room with light, tricking himself into committing to "just" 10 minutes of staying awake, doing his creative work early in the morning, and a bit of exercise worked for him. The real secret, he writes, is in getting enough sleep that mornings just feel like a soft transition from sleep, but his other strategies can help when that basic foundation fails. Photo by sleepyneko. (Original post)

    3. Set a Morning Prep Reminder the Night Before

    Whether it's your watch, your cellphone, or a microwave reminder, set something in your home to beep at a certain time every night. When that beep goes off, around 10 p.m., for instance, it means you should drop what you're doing and spend just a bit of time preparing for your morning, while you're actually awake. LifeClever calls it the 10 O'Clock Rule, and suggests a few things we can all do to semi-automate our mornings: set out your clothes, pocket contents, and shoes, grind coffee, check your calendar for events and reminders, and packing anything you're bound to forget into your bag. It's a night person's best hedge against the morning, and a morning person's ticket to spending their energy on more exciting things. Photo by Aidan Wojtas. (Original post)

    2. Crank Out Some Push-Ups

    When a loud noise wakes you up, you might notice you're not quite so groggy and annoyed as wide-awake and alert. Cranking out push-ups first thing in the morning can provide some of that same kind of bio-feedback that tells your body it's time to get up and do something, something maybe even related to caveman-instinct survival. Do as many push-ups as you can (or as many feel comfortable, without sore arms), wait 30 seconds, then repeat two more times. Personal trainer Dan Boyle swears by it, and some of our commenters find it reliable, too. Photo by whyld. (Original post).

    1. Know Your Peak Performance Times

    Different people find their energy, and inspiration arriving at different times, but not everybody can rearrange their work schedule. If that sounds like you, you can benefit from learning the peak times for early-risers and night owls, or learning your own energy schedule. If you're a data hound who likes specifics, you can do more than deal in generalities of morning, afternoon, and evening—you can map and graph your daily ups and downs. Photo by Hamed Saber. (Original posts: night owls, energy map)


    What change to your morning routine has made the biggest difference in your days? What parts of your early hours still need work? Share your scheduling strategies in the comments.
  • May 14, 12:27 PM

    Who knew?

    Shared by Will
    Crap.
    An important new finding:
    Kenrick et al.'s experiments demonstrate that men who view photographs of physically attractive women or Playboy centerfolds subsequently find their current mates less physically attractive and become less satisfied with their current relationships. What then would be the cumulative effect of being exposed to young, attractive women on a daily basis? Would there be any real consequences to the men's dissatisfaction with their relationships? Secondary school teachers and college professors come in contact with more young women at the peak of their reproductive value than others do. The analysis of a large, representative data set from the United States indicates that, while men in general are less likely to be divorced than women, and secondary school teachers and college professors in general are less likely to be divorced than others, simultaneously being male and being a secondary school teacher or college professor statistically increases the likelihood of being divorced (p <.05).
    Crap.
  • May 14, 12:00 PM

    How to Quit Facebook Without Actually Quitting Facebook [Privacy]

    With all the privacy issues surrounding Facebook, many people are considering quitting the site altogether. If you're not ready to take it that far, here's how to avoid the privacy breaches without completely deleting your account and losing touch with your friends.

    Photo by Ludovic Berton.

    Should I Quit Facebook Altogether?

    We've all had that one friend who deactivated his/her Facebook and was never seen again, because no one could establish contact. As if the telephone, email, and IM were never invented, many people are at a loss as to how to contact you if your Facebook isn't an easy click away. Even if the situation isn't quite that dire, Facebook is still how a lot of people keep connected, and severing that connection completely is a big deal.

    But now, privacy-minded folks have many legitimate reasons you should quit Facebook (or reasons you should but can't go through with it), the same thing is on everyone's mind: Is the grief of quitting worth avoiding future privacy breaches?

    The Less Extreme Alternative

    Luckily, there is another, more middle-of-the-road option. That's not to say this isn't still extreme—this isn't for the faint of heart. It isn't a tutorial about how to change your privacy settings. This is a tutorial on how to create the most minimalist Facebook profile possible, with as little information on yourself as possible, to be used only for communication between you and your friends. You won't be able to do much on the site; you probably won't even visit the site that often. This is not for people who want to continue using Facebook; it is for the people who are ready to up and quit tomorrow, but don't want to miss out on the next party just because they care about their privacy. So if you're really ready to give up wall posts, comments, Farmville, and fan pages, here's how to proceed without falling off the face of the Earth.

    Create a Disposable Email Address for Your Account

    We've talked about disposable email addresses before, and most people probably already have one. (The idea being that if you create a second email address for free and sign up for the sketchy sites with it, you won't have to deal with spam in your main account later on.) With all the bugs and privacy gaffes surrounding Facebook, it has certainly become one of those sites you could call sketchy.

    With this email address, you can also set up notifications for messages and event invites and get all that by email (so you don't ever have to actually "check" Facebook), and even forward it to your main email account. That way, you won't have to check this separate one, but if something ever happens (like Facebook making your email public for 30 minutes), you can delete the disposable address, make a new one, link it with Facebook, and not have to deal with the spam forever. You can use any service to do this, but I'd personally just make a new Gmail address separate from my regular Google account, sign into it using Private Browsing mode (so you don't sign yourself out of your regular Gmail), set up the forwarding filters, and forget it. (To set up forwarding, just log into your disposable account, click Create Filter, and set the filter to forward any email From:facebook to your real account. If things get ugly, you can always turn the filter off.)

    Create a New Account and Transfer Your Friends

    Technically, this part is optional, but I also think it has the biggest impact on how the rest of your experience will pan out. You could just edit all the information on your current account, but if you make a new one and delete the old one you'll have a completely clean slate. You won't have any posts lingering around anywhere, no personal information for the taking and no photos tagged of you. Plus, this is prime time to get rid of all your friends that you don't need. Do you really still need to be Facebook friends with that girl you met at that party that time? Didn't think so.

    This process is actually quite simple, especially because you have a new email address as created in step one. Log out of Facebook and create a new account using that email address. Don't enter any information, and for now, don't make any new friends except with yourself (you'll need to friend your old account for this to work smoothly). Bask in the glory of that clean, privacy-filled profile, and then log back into your old account and accept the friend request to your new one. Alternatively, open up a second browser and use one for your old account and one for your new account, just for this process—you'll be switching back and forth a lot.

    Conveniently, Facebook will then ask you to suggest friends for your new account (if not, you can do so by visiting your new account's profile page from your old account). This is the part of the process in which you'll transfer over the friends you actually want with one fell swoop—no spending hours searching each and every one of them out. Go through the entire list of your friends and check off the ones you want to keep. It won't take nearly as long as you think it will, I promise. Click Send and then move over to your new account. All those suggestions will be pending friend requests that you can run through quickly and add each as a friend (again, it looks like a tedious process, but shouldn't take too long) and you'll have all the friends you need.

    If you want to hold on to your old account during the transition, that's fine, but the point of making a new one is to delete all the old stuff, so when you're ready, go ahead and delete (not just deactivate) that old account. It'll try to tempt you into staying by showing you pictures of your friends, but you can press continue without guilt knowing you're still going to (mostly) be around.

    Turn Off the Wall on Your Profile

    There are a few privacy settings we need to tweak on the new account, so hit "Account" in the upper left hand corner of your window and click Privacy Settings. The first area we'll venture into is "Personal Information and Posts" to turn off the wall. This way, you won't have your profile covered with the stupid things your friends say; it'll just be your very barren news feed.

    Everything else here can stay the same; you don't need to make anything else private. You aren't going to be making any posts, you aren't going to be filling out information, and you aren't going to be uploading photos, so no need to cover them up. Again, keep in mind—this isn't about changing privacy, this is about quitting unnecessary Facebook activity, so it doesn't matter what these privacy settings are. They're just going to go public again after the next redesign, so why mess with them now?

    Hide Your Email Address

    Next, head back to your Privacy settings and go to "Contact Information". You could add more info here, like your phone number, if you want your friends to have easy access, but we've already seen how Facebook can make information public, even unintentionally. That's why we created the junk email address back at the beginning of this process. I'd just leave it all blank.

    Down next to your registered email address is the privacy setting for who can see it. Click on it and hit customize. In the dropdown at the top of the popup window, choose "only me" and click save. Your email address is now hidden from everyone, including your friends. If you want to make it visible to them, you can—sometimes people get in a bind and may want to contact you via email with something that physically can't be sent via Facebook message—but again, it's just a junk email address. You don't want your friends actually thinking that's your address, because then you have a lot more work to do if you ever have to trash it and get a new one as mentioned above. Just keep it a secret.

    Hide Media Tagged With Your Name

    As of right now, you can only keep tagged photos and videos out of search results and off your profile. There is currently no way to actually prevent people from tagging photos of you. With this setting, people won't be able to see photos of you from your profile page, but if they get to the picture by other means (by, say, looking at the actual album or linking to it from the profile of someone else tagged in it) they will still see your name on the photo. Yes, it's a glaring omission from the privacy features in Facebook, but it also doesn't matter much. Unfortunately, the responsibility does and will always have to lie with your friends that are uploading pictures. Facebook will never be able to stop them from uploading a picture of you, and they'll never be able to stop that person from tagging that photo with a name, any name (including yours), whether or not it is linked to a profile. But even if it does, your profile is completely empty. What's the difference between it linking to your empty profile and being unclickable text? The only fool-proof solution to the photo tagging problem is to kick your friends in the shin if they post embarrassing pictures of you. Or, you know, get some more mature friends.

    To stop tagged photos from showing up on your profile, though, go back to Privacy Settings and hit "Friends, Tags, & Connections". Edit the "Photos and Videos of Me" setting just like you did in the last step so only you can see the tags, and save the settings. This will delete the link to "photos of you" under your profile picture.

    Hide Yourself from Facebook and Google Searches

    You can tweak this next step to your liking. You probably don't want your profile showing up in Google, but if you want people to find you on Facebook you might want to stay in those search results (since people won't be able to find you through activity on your friends' walls, because there won't be any). At the same time, you may wish to have complete control over who you become Facebook friends with, and that's fine too. In Privacy Settings, hit up the "Search" section and uncheck Public Search Results. Set your Facebook Search Results to whatever you want the same way you did for photos.

    Lock Down Applications (Just In Case)

    This is the one area where I would just make everything as private as possible. You never know what those darned applications are going to do, and while you're not going to be running around Facebook installing anything, you can never be too careful. I wouldn't even recommend you stay logged into Facebook while you browse the web, since we've all seen they're always watching you. Under Privacy Settings, head to Applications and Websites and go nuts. Edit what your friends can share about you and what you can share about your friends down to nothing, and set your activity visible only to you. Again, keep in mind that even if applications were to share your information—you don't really have any information to share, so you're probably safe. The darned things are just so annoying that I'd like to lock them down as much as possible.

    I'd also go into notification settings (under Account > Account Settings > Notifications) and turn off any notifications having to do with applications. In fact, while you're there, you might as well turn everything else off except for messages, event invitations, and (if you want) photo tagging, because you won't be doing much else on Facebook, so there's no reason to clutter up your inbox. Every once in a while, it's probably a good idea to log in and clear all your unnecessary notifications, but other than that, you should be able to get the few necessary features to notify you via email.


    While I'd like to say you won't have to pay attention to Facebook's privacy gaffes ever again, that just isn't the case. With each redesign, you'll want to do a quick scan of either the privacy settings, policy, or just the blogosphere to see what fresh new hell Facebook unleashes, but in general, no matter how much of your information they try to share, there isn't much on this minimal profile that can get out there. There are a few things Facebook will always have on you, such as your email address and list of friends, so these are the important things to check up on. But if you don't have anything else on your profile, it's hard to see how applications taking information from your profile is going to be a big disadvantage if there isn't anything on it to take.

    Your life won't be completely free of Facebook drama, but it will be significantly easier since you won't have to pour through how-tos (like this one) trying to figure out how to get everything set straight again. It should be a pretty easy process from now on. And, best of all, your friends can't complain about you being "hard to get a hold of", and you won't miss out on the next gathering just because the invitation went out on Facebook. To be perfectly clear, though: I'm not saying this is what everybody should do. If you're not violently furious with Facebook (I'm personally not), let it go. But, if you are seriously thinking about quitting, I think this is a set-up to consider, if you haven't already. If you have, be sure to share your tips for a minimalist Facebook in the comments.

  • May 13, 04:00 PM

    The Smartest Way To Find a New Job On Google [Search]

    Alec Brownstein wanted a job in advertising, so he made pages that showed up as the first result when several big New York creative directors Googled themselves. He got interviews with nearly all of them. Yeah, it's pretty brilliant.

  • May 12, 05:23 PM

    Not So Slippery Slopes

    Bernstein reports on stories that weren't:

    Iowa and marriage.  It's been a year now that same-sex marriage has been the law in radical lefty Iowa, and no one seems to care.  As far as I'm aware, it's not really much of an issue there; here's an article from last month giving an update.

    (Image via Waking Up Now)




  • May 12, 10:51 AM

    Forget temperament -- what about judicial lifespan?

    If you want to see the insanity of lifetime appointments for Supreme Court justices thrown into sharp relief, check out Nate Silver's model that builds the life expectancy of a judge into an overall assessment of his or her value.

    In the model, he compares the more-liberal Diane Wood (age 59) to Elena Kagan (age 50). Assuming that Wood will vote to please liberals 100 percent of the time and Kagan will only be with them 90 percent of the time, Silver's model ranks Kagan as the winner:

    Kagan overtakes Wood even though she’s less liberal, because she’s more likely to have survived. She continues to provide excess value over Kagan from that point forward, until we reach a period 40+ years out where both women are almost certain to be dead. On balance, Kagan’s lifetime expected [value] is actually higher than that of Kagan’s (1,280 rather than 1,206, if you care), assuming that she’ll defect from the liberals 10 percent of the time whereas Wood never will.

    People don't, and shouldn't, think of judges in quite such stark terms. But that's because people don't like thinking this way. The actual system we've set up actually makes this sort of analysis the most logical way to think about Supreme Court appointments.




    Supreme Court - Elena Kagan - United States - Supreme Court of the United States - Barack Obama

  • May 11, 05:07 PM

    Wash Your Hands (Literally) After a Big Decision to Cut Down on Second-Guessing - Science - Lifehacker

    Shared by Will
    1. UM has a grad student named Spike Lee.
    2. UM has grad students performing experiments on hand washing.
    3. I hate cyberbullies.
    According to a University of Michigan Ann Arbor study, the physical act of washing your hands can help remove those niggling second thoughts about a decision you've made. 1. UM has a grad student named Spike Lee.
    2. UM has grad students performing experiments on hand washing.
    3. I hate cyberbullies.
  • May 11, 04:00 PM

    Open Letter to Steve Jobs: It's Time to Stop the Censorship [Apple]

    Look at this magazine cover. It's Madonna. Madonna showing her breasts. Without nipples. Why? Because of Apple's silent censorship, that's why. We said it already: It's time to declare war against Apple's censorship. Steve, you are going the wrong way.

    In case you are not aware of it, here's what happened: British fashion magazine Dazed & Confused has made an iPad version of their magazine. Internally, they call it the "Iran Edition" because they have to censor any nudity, no matter how innocent it is. This is not the first time that this happens, but this is even worse, because nudity in a fashion magazine is actually editorial content: There are plenty of designers who use transparent fabrics or risque cleavages. Not to mention lingerie.

    Seriously, you can't keep doing this. You just can't. It's only going to explode in your face. Like all the dumb app-approval moves Apple has made in the last few months. Steve: Don't you remember the last time you tried to have full control over everything and everyone? Yes? It ended badly for you—ousted from your own company—with Apple about to die, and with Microsoft ruling the world.

    See, I have been using my iPad for more than a month now. And my iPhone for almost three years. And after all this time, I still think you have the chance to redefine computers once again. In fact, I think you have set that metamorphosis in motion already. But the iPad or Apple won't be in that certain computing future if you guys keep doing this.

    You just can't dictate policies that lead to the arbitrary censorship of certain applications. For political sentiments, for foul language, for showing nipples. Why do this? You have an age control system built into all your devices. Use it and let people decide on their own. Don't try to be my father or my mother. Instead, enable people to communicate with your devices. Make that policy clear to everyone. No holds. No barriers.

    I know what you are going to say. Apple is your company. Yes, it is and you can do whatever the hell you want with it. But this is just not cool. This sucks. This is not you. Apple was never a fake corporation like Disney or a cold behemoth like IBM. You used to give IBM the finger, remember? And remember when you used to smoke joints while having days at the beach, enjoying the California sun and tofu burgers with the Macintosh team? Or the pirate flag at Bandley 3?

    You used to be the misfits, the rebels, the troublemakers, the square pegs in the round holes, the ones who were never fond of the rules. Remember?

    People liked you because of that. And now, this is what you have become:

    Jon Stewart recently pointed this out. And Bild Digital's CEO Donata Hopfen said that "today [Apple] censor nipples, tomorrow editorial content." Her prophecy became reality. So please, listen before it's to late. It's time to return that nipple to Madonna, and lift any kind of censorship from the app store. [Shiny Shiny via Vallewag]

  • May 06, 04:13 PM

    Like a civics textbook come to life

    The Senate is currently considering Richard Shelby's amendment to move the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from the Federal Reserve to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., substantially weakening it along the way. Annie Lowrey reports on how the debate is playing out:

    Senators are currently debating the amendment on the floor, and they aren’t pulling their punches. A few minutes ago, Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) bellowed, “[This amendment] is designed to take a knife and carve the heart out of this financial reform!”

    In response, Sen. Mike Enzi (R-Wy.) said, “You cannot denigrate the other party and denigrate every single thing they put up as an amendment!” He added, “If every amendment is going to get the treatment this amendment is getting, … we’re not going to have much success on this bill!” He then argued that the bill, as written, would control, “every single little thing for Middle America!”

    President Barack Obama also weighed into the consumer protection debate, releasing a statement that says, “Alternatives that gut consumer protections and do nothing to empower the American people by cracking down on unfair and predatory practices are unacceptable, and I urge the Senate to vote no.” He also said Shelby’s amendment had been “written by Wall Street’s lobbyists.”

    World's greatest deliberative body, baby.



  • May 07, 11:35 PM

    William Shatner’s Stake in Priceline.com

    The Toronto Sun:

    Unofficial word on Wall Street is that Shatner, who was initially paid in Priceline shares when he became pitchman for the Internet travel website startup in 1997, is now worth a cool $600 million.

    Genius.

    Update 7 May 2010: Shatner says it isn’t so.

  • May 04, 12:46 PM

    Cool Ad Watch

    For a department store in the UK:

    (Hat tip: LikeCool)




  • May 03, 12:14 PM

    Nick Clegg and Samuel Beckett

    I guess the Guardian asked the party leaders in the UK to write about who they admire most, and Nick Clegg offered Irish playwrite Samuel Beckett as his choice. Three reactions. One is that, as Michael Tomasky says, it seems inconceivable to imagine this happening in the United States:

    You British folks understand, don’t you, that if an American presidential candidate said his hero was Samuel Beckett, he’d be finished. I mean totally finished. He couldn’t even get away with an American equivalent. It’d be one thing for a US pol to say Mark Twain. That’s about the only serious writer in history a pol could name and survive.

    The second is that even though it seems inconceivable, I think Tomasky is actually wrong that it would be deadly. Presidential elections are overwhelmingly determined by the fundamentals. I think people used to think that you couldn’t win a presidential election while being a black man named “Barack Hussein Obama” whose autobiography admits to cocaine use and who used to represent Hyde Park in the State Senate while attending a black nationalist church. It just turns out that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our narrow conventional wisdom. So I wish someone would say the person he admires most is an avant-garde writer, if only to break the taboo which might, in turn, help us build a less relentlessly anti-intellectual public culture.

    Third: I won’t try to claim that Beckett is the person I admire most, or even my favorite dramatist (Ibsen, I guess), but I do like him. Titling the link roundup posts “Endgame” is supposed to be a reference to his play. I won’t claim to be a brilliant expositor of this enigmatic work, but I think its themes tie in niceless with the link roundup concept—it’s an end, but utterly lacking in finality and merely doomed to be repeated again and again ad nauseam.

  • May 01, 05:16 PM

    "Flying Blind in Policy Reforms"

    Jeff Sachs says "our political system regularly puts around the table people who are not the best equipped to find deep solutions to our problems." He wants outside experts to have more influence in the formulation and execution of major policy changes:

    Flying Blind in Policy Reforms, by Jeffrey D. Sachs, Commentary, Scientific American: The long and divisive fight over U.S. health care reform exposed basic weaknesses in the processes of governance. As is so often true in American politics these days, politicians and lobbyists kept complex subjects to themselves, pushing expert discussion and systematic public debate to the sidelines. ...
    During 14 months of debate over health care, the administration did not put forward a clear, analytical policy white paper on the aims, methods and expected results of the proposed reforms. ... The actual health consequences of the legislation were never reviewed or debated coherently. ...
    One might think that the real action had all happened earlier, in congressional hearings, in brainstorming sessions and in the bargaining sessions with key stakeholders. Yet the earlier process was relentlessly driven by political and lobbying calculations and without the informed participation of the American people, who were left to vent at Tea Parties and on blog sites. The mammoth legislation is impenetrable... Experts were never invited systematically to comment or debate about it so as to help the public and politicians understand the issues. The lack of clear policy documents from the administration meant that the public had little basis for reaction other than gut instincts and fearful sentiments fanned by talk-show hosts.
    In general, our political system regularly puts around the table people who are not the best equipped to find deep solutions to our problems. Certainly it has also done so on climate change... As with health care, the outcome has been House and Senate draft legislation that lacks public support. The same has been true on Afghanistan: the “war cabinet” has lacked real expertise on that country’s culture, economy and development challenges, and the U.S. public has remained uninformed of true options.
    As a start toward better policy making, the administration should put forward a detailed analysis justifying each major proposed policy change. That white paper could form the basis for coherent public debate and reflection, along with Web sites where outside experts would be invited to share opinions accessible to the public. The public, too, would be invited to blog about that position paper. ... The administration and Congress would rely more heavily on external advisory panels to tap into the nation’s wealth of expertise...

    I would not presume or recommend that decisions be left to the purported experts, who often represent special interests or have their own biases or narrow views. Still, a systematic vetting of policy options, with recognized experts and the public commenting and debating, will vastly improve on our current policy performance, in which we often fly blind or hand the controls over to narrow interests and viewpoints.

    The problem I see, at least in economics, is not so much the absence of experts weighing in on issues. Instead, it's the inability of the press, and hence the public more generally, to distinguish between expert and non-expert opinion. All too often the two are given a false equivalence in a "he said, she said" journalistic construction that obscures and confuses people about the issue. This can even do more harm than good in terms of informing the public.

  • April 30, 11:42 AM

    Leslie Buck, Designer of Iconic Coffee Cup, Dies at 87 - Obituary (Obit) - NYTimes.com

    The Grecian design seems to have been here forever, as if bestowed on New York by the gods. But in fact, it was created by man.

Posts

  • March 08, 03:39 PM

    Is Being Wiped Out a Good Thing?

    I’m trying to decide whether or not to push through and continuing reading for evidence, or to hold back and consider some big-picture issues surrounding this semester.  Which is to say, I’m having a tough time getting my head in the game.

  • March 02, 01:29 PM

    Weebly

    If you’ve never heard of it, I’ll leave it at this: any site that sends passive agressive emails when you don’t visit often enough is doing something wrong.  I got lured away by Flavors.  Simple as that.

  • March 02, 01:27 PM

    Dinner for Fourteen

    Word is, planning a vacation produces more happiness than any other activity.

    As it stands, I’m more stressed out about this upcoming trip than I’d like to be, or than is even remotely reasonable.

  • February 25, 02:01 PM

    HCR Summit

    I caught about twenty minutes of today’s summit.  Two things:

    1. The White House’s iPhone App is awesome.
    2. Do Republicans have to do anything but look reasonable?  It seems taking a page from the Peggy Noonan playbook would be the most effective tactic to ensure that nothing changed between yesterday and tomorrow.
  • February 17, 02:17 PM

    Procastinating

    I am supposed to be writing when I feel an urge to surf political news.  That hasn’t happened yet…

  • February 16, 11:02 PM

    The Rules of Lent

    If I haven’t mentioned it, I am giving up online political news for Lent.  God knows why I still do this.

    The spirit behind “giving up political news” is to cease consuming news without restraint.  That said, it would overshoot the goal to willfully isolate myself from the general development in civil society.

    Here are the rules, as I’ve determined them thus far.

    1. Visiting the following bloggers/organizations is against the rules: TPMHuffPoMatt Yglesias, The Atlantic’s Voices, and Ezra Klein.
    2. Anything in written form (ex.- newspapers, magazines) is permissible, as long as it is consumed in that medium (i.e.- no reading NYT online).
    3. Any links sent to me through social media that don’t fall into these categories are acceptable.
    4. As to (3), clicking through beyond the original link is not acceptable.

    Borderline cases will be addressed as they arise, keeping in mind the spirit of the overall project.  Any thoughts about how this can be better tweaked would be appreciated.

Posts

  • July 25, 08:11 PM

    Kovalchuk’s Contract Puzzle

    Somewhat amazingly, the hockey blogosphere has been philosophizing about what intention involves in the wake of NHL’s rejection of the unprecedented contract that Ilya Kovalchuk signed with the New Jersey Devils. As a philosopher-in-training and a casual Devils fan, I am weighing in on this issue.

    Here is the news summary, for those of you who have not been following. Kovalchuk is the LeBron James of hockey this summer: a player that can significantly improve a team and an unrestricted free agent at a relatively young age. The Devils, the Los Angeles Kings, and possibly KHL have been vying for his service. The Devils ended up winning the bid, signing him to a 17-year $102-million contract that, due to the way it’s structured, will pay Kovalchuk to play for minimum salary in the last few years until he is 44. The NHL has rejected the contract because they think it’s a circumvention of the collective bargaining agreement. One of the reasons for their rejection is their judgment that Kovalchuk has no intention to play until he is 44, and that the last few years were just added on to lower the annual salary cap hit.

    A Kings fan blogger has drawn an analogy between Kovalchuk’s contract and Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle, and argued that Kovalchuk cannot intend to play at age 44 because he cannot “reasonably expect” himself to play at age 44. Unfortunately, this argument relies on a mistaken understanding of what Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle tells us about intention. (Not surprising, perhaps, since the understanding is apparently founded on the wikipedia entry.) Only when we adequately understand what intention involves can we fairly assess whether Kovalchuk plausibly intends to play until he is 44, and consequently assess whether his recent contract ought to be rejected.

    Recently, philosopher Nishi Shah has advanced an account of intention in his “How Action Governs Intention” (Philosophers’ Imprint 2008; free access). The main thesis, as the title indicates, is that what an agent should intend depends only on what she should do. In practical deliberation, when an agent asks herself whether to intend (to perform an action) A, that question gives way to, and is fully settled by her answer to, the question whether to A. In slogan form: intention aims at to-be-doneness. An agent only has reasons to intend A if and only if she has reasons to A. (I encourage readers to read the research article for the details of Shah’s account, but this brief summary is sufficient for the purpose here.)

    In asking whether Kovalchuk intends to play until he is 44, we need only ask whether Kovalchuk has all-things-considered reasons to play until he is 44. One complication: we need to remember that we are not asking what an ideal practical reasoner in Kovalchuk’s position intends, but what Kovalchuk himself intends. Professional athletes are rarely known for being ideal practical reasoners, and for good reason. They often overestimate their own abilities and hang on for longer than an ideal practical reasoner in their positions would advise. For illustration, look at Michael Jordan. At age 39 and clearly past his prime, he chose to come back to the NBA and play for minimum salary. (I realize this example is not perfect because Jordan did retire before he came back. But I am sure readers can find better examples.) Similar examples of hubris abound: athletes often do not leave their sport by their own accord. They want to play as long as possible. Obviously, no one knows exactly what went on in Kovalchuk’s mind. But if he deliberates like many other athletes, he probably sees himself as having reasons to play until he is 44. The minimum salary is not an issue because he will already be rich by then. And, well, he wants to play. Insofar he sees all-things-considered reasons to play until he is 44, he can be said to genuinely intend to play until he is 44.

    But wait, doesn’t it matter that less than 1% of NHL players have played until they are 44? The point this question raises is one that the Kings fan blogger and other commentators have repeatedly emphasized, culminating in the following claim: “not only is it not possible for [Kovalchuk] to promise to do something that he has no reasonable expectation of being able to do, but it’s not possible for him to intend to do it either.” Suppose that Kovalchuk has all-things-considered reasons to believe that he will be not be playing until he is 44, can he still be said to genuinely intend to play until he is 44?

    Yes, contrary to what the Kings fan blogger and commentators seem to think. It’s irrelevant that less than 1% of NHL players have played until they are 44 because the question we are interested in is what Kovalchuk intends, and not what Kovalchuk predicts. Action, not prediction, governs intention, and the predictive question is distinct from the action question. Shah argues for this distinction:

    The answer to the practical question whether to A is determined by reasons that show A-ing to be desirable; the answer to the predictive question whether one will A is determined by evidence for the proposition that one will A.

    … normally one can arrive at an intention to A by determining that it is desirable to A. If the question whether to A were equivalent to the predictive question whether one will A, only evidence that one will A could settle it. The desirability of A-ing is not evidence that one will A. Thus, were the two questions identical, it would not be possible to arrive at an intention to A by determining that it would be desirable to A. But we know from our own experience of practical deliberation that it is possible to arrive at an intention to A by determining that it would be desirable to A. Therefore the question whether to A is not identical to the predictive question whether one will A. (6)

    To put the point brazenly, for Kovalchuk to have reasons to intend, what he has reasons to believe will be true does not matter, only what he has reasons to desire does. It might well be true that Kovalchuk cannot “reasonably expect” to play until he is 44, but that does not matter for answering whether he intends to play until he is 44. In more theoretical terms, since the predictive question is distinct from the action question, and only answering the action question matters for answering the intention question, the answer to the predictive question is irrelevant to the answer to the intention question.

    Takeaway lessons? Insofar as the legitimacy of the contract only turns on Kovalchuk’s intention (which is probably not the case), the NHL does not have good reasons to reject the contract because it does not have good reasons to think Kovalchuk does not genuinely intend to play until he is 44. That he is unlikely to play until he is 44 is irrelevant because intention does not depend on evidence for what will be true. You can accuse him of hubris — it wouldn’t be the first for a professional athlete — but you can hardly accuse him of being insincere in his intention.

    (Full disclosure: Philosophy of action is not my area of expertise, so I am open to philosophers who know more to correct me. Watch the comments.)


  • July 24, 01:03 AM

    Elga’s Highly Restricted Principle of Indifference

    In the Sleeping Beauty paper, Elga tells us that “Since being in [Tails and Monday] is subjectively just like being in [Tails and Tuesday], and since exactly the same propositions are true whether you are in [Tails and Monday] or [Tails and Tuesday], even a highly restricted principle of indifference yields that you ought then to have equal credence in each”.

    Recall that the unrestricted Principle of Indifference says that when your evidence doesn’t give you any more reason to believe one proposition rather than another, you should assign credence to the possibilities equally.

    The more restricted principle Elga seems to be endorsing here is this:

    Highly Restricted POI: If some collection of situations are subjectively identical and exactly the same uncentered propositions are true at them, one ought to divide one’s credences among them.

    The regular POI is famously plighted by a worry that it delivers inconsistent dictates. Consider the Cube Factory example from Van Fraassen: All you know about some object is that it is a cube and is less than 2 units wide.  So, {It’s less than one unit wide, It’s not less than one unit wide} partitions the possibilities.  So, by POI, you should have .5 credence in it being less than one unit wide.  {Its side area is less than one unit, Its side area is at least one and less then 2 units, Its side area is at least 2 and less than 3 units, Its side area is at least 3 and less than 4 units} also partitions the space. So, by POI, you should have credence .25 that its side area is less than 1 unit.  But, of course, its side area is less than one unit iff it’s less than one unit wide, so POI instructs you to have distinct credences in the one proposition.

    Choosing one partition over another to divide’s credences among would have the agent importing more information than she has, according to the Imprecise Bayesian (Levi (1980), Jeffrey (1983), Kaplan (1996), and Joyce (2005, p. 171)).   For this reason, the Imprecise Bayesian rejects POI.   I think the Imprecise Bayesian ought to reject Highly Restricted POI for the same reason they reject POI: employing it has the agent believe as though she has more information than she does.  This case shows that:

    Actual Cube Factories: An agent is certain that she is at some point on a line of continuum-many cube factories where the side length of the cubes produced in the factories ranges from 0 meters on one end to 2 meters on the other (including every real number possibility).  She doesn’t know where she is on the line as all of the spots on the line look the same.  What should be the agent’s credence that the factory in front of her makes cubes of side length between 0 and 1 meter?

    Here, the agent is certain of the uncentered propositions in play, but she is uncertain of where she is in those worlds.  Here, Highly Restricted POI gives contradictory dictates.  The centered possibility where she is in front of a factory making cubes of side lengths 0 to 1 is subjectively identical to the one in which she is in front of a factory making cubes of side lengths 1 to 2.  So, by Highly Restricted POI, she should have credence 1/2 in the first possibility.  But, the centered possibilities where she is in front of factories making cubes of side areas 0 to 1, 1 to 2, 2 to 3, 3 to 4 are also subjectively identical.  Hence she should also have credence 1/4 in the side area being between 0 and 1.  But, the side area between 0 and 1 is just the possibility where it has side length between 0 and 1.  So, the Highly Restricted POI gives also gives inconsistent dictates, and the Imprecise Bayesian ought to reject it for the same reason they reject the regular POI.


  • March 07, 10:43 AM

    March Events in the Department

    Hello Gruers,

    This month is ridiculously busy and exciting at the University of Michigan Philosophy Department.  Here’s a sampling of this month’s events.  All are welcome to any of the listed events.

    This week is ethics week (six ethics talks in five days).

    * Tuesday, 3/9:  Steve Angle, Tang Junyi Lecture

    * Wednesday, 3/10:  Sam Fleischacker, 4:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m   Tanner Library

    “Hume and Smith on Sympathy: A Contrast, Critique, and Reconstruction”

    * Thursday, 3/11:  Steve Angle, Tang Junyi Lecture

    * Friday, 3/12:  Tim Scanlon 4:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m., East Conference Room of Rackham

    “Metaphysical Questions about Normative Reasons”

    * Saturday 3/13: Sharon Street, 10:00 a.m.–12:00 p.m. East Conference Room of Rackham

    “Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason”

    * Saturday 3/13: Michael Smith, 1:30 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.  East Conference Room of Rackham

    “Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (And Four Replies)

    Next week is metaphysics and epistemology week:

    * Tuesday 3/16: John Hawthorne, 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM, Tanner.

    * Thursday 3/18:  John Hawthorne, 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM, Michigan League, Vandenberg Room

    “How Many Angels Could Dance on the Head of a Pin?”

    * Friday 3/19: John Hawthorne, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, 2036 Angell Hall.

    Finally, we finish off the month with the Tanner Lecture

    * Friday 3/26:  Susan Neiman 4:00 PM -6:00 PM, Michigan Union Ballroom

    * Saturday 3/27 :  9:00-12:30, Tanner Symposium, Union Pendleton Room

    9:00 – 9:45           Lorraine Daston

    9:45 – 10:30         Philip Kitcher

    11:00 – 11:45       Alexander Nehamas

    On top of all this, the department is hosting a number of additional special visitors this month!

    If you have questions about any of these events, please contact the department office.


  • February 12, 05:08 AM

    Theories of Pretense

    Ori Friedman and Alan Leslie, in their Cognition article “The conceptual underpinnings of pretense: Pretending is not ‘behaving-as-if’” (2007), argue against what they call behaviorist theories of pretense. As they characterize the debate, theories of pretense fall into the following two families:

    Metarepresentational Theories: What is central to pretense is mentalistic: treating pretense as such through the possession and deployment of the concept PRETEND. (Leslie is the primary proponent of this view.)

    Behaviorist Theories: What is central to pretense is behavioral: behaving “as-if” a scenario obtains–or rather, behaving in a way that would be appropriate if that scenario obtains. (On Friedman and Leslie’s characterization, pretty much everyone else–such as Perner, Lillard, Nichols and Stich, Harris, and Rakoczy–defends some kind of behaviorist theory.)

    One central point in they make the paper is this: without making room for the concept PRETEND in their theories, behaviorists cannot adequately explain how children are able to recognize pretense as such. Here is how they put this central point on page 115:

    But more importantly, the above makes clear what game the Behavioral theory perforce finds itself playing: namely, trying to get the child to think that someone is pretending without actually thinking pretend as such. If the Behavioral theory is to measure up to the phenomena of early human pretending, its success will depend on finding an exact conceptual paraphrase of PRETEND without using that concept. Moreover, the paraphrase must be strictly behavioral. … Propositional attitude concepts are the heart and soul of ‘theory of mind’ and utterly foreign to and rejected by behaviorism (Fodor, 1981; Ryle, 1949). ‘Pretend’ is just the name of a specific attitude.

    In response, I have two small worries and a major one:

    1. Equivocation on Behaviorism: There seems to be an equivocation between the so-called “behaviorist” theories of pretense (a name given by Friedman and Leslie themselves) and earlier general behaviorist theories of mind. The functionalist theory that Nichols and Stich defend, for example, clearly do not reject propositional attitudes or propositional attitude concepts.

    2. Relationship between Concepts and Attitudes: There seems to be a strange assumption about the relationship between concepts and propositional attitudes. Behaviorist theories can happily concede that pretend is the name of a specific attitude, and that even young children have this attitude, and still claim that children do not have the concept PRETEND. In other words, if all the phenomena related to pretense can be explained by a psychology including the pretense attitude, behaviorist theories do not in addition need to posit possession of the concept PRETEND. Friedman and Leslie, however, appear to assume that one cannot have the attitude without the concept, and that just seems bizarre.

    3. Implications of Concept Possession: As far as I understand it, usually behaviorists say that it’s some other psychological process that underlies the recognition of pretense. We recognize pretense through behavioral cues, which can be instinctual, conventional, or somewhere in between. “Thinking about pretense as such” is an ambiguous phrase, but it seems to me that a child who does recognize behavioral indicators of pretense is thinking about pretense as such, even if she does not possess, and is thus not applying, the concept PRETEND. Compare: it seems that even without possessing the concept of CONTRASTIVE FOCUS REDUPLICATION, I can use this kind of syntactic construction and recognize that others are doing so. In particular, when I am recognizing others’ use of contrastic focus reduplication, there is an important sense that I am thinking about it as such: I am attending to the phenomenon the concept refers to. The general point is that the best theoretical explanation of a phenomenon may not be the same as how subjects involved would conceptualize it.

    To tackle this point from a different perspective, consider animal playfighting. Researchers have observed animals such as rats, canids, and primates use behavioral cues to indicate when they are playfighting rather than genuinely fighting. Are we to attribute the possession and deployment of the concept PRETEND to rats, canids, and primates?

    Perhaps the answer is ‘yes’, but now we really have to question what Leslie and collegues mean by possessing and deploying concepts. Friedman and Leslie, on page 120, clarifies that they do not mean anything particularly “heavy-duty” and denies many implications I think we naturally associate with possessing and deploying concepts. They write,

    To be clear, we do not believe that children’s possession of this concept implies that they know much about this or other mental states. In particular, it does not imply that they theorize about mental representation or that they theorize that pretense is an ‘internal, subjective, mentally depictive state’, as some have supposed (e.g., Hickling, Wellman, & Gottfried, 1997). Nor does it require that children can report that pretenders ‘are thinking’ and what they are ‘thinking about’ while pretending (e.g., Rosen, Schwebel, & Singer, 1997). What it does mean is that they are able, within performance limits (Bosco et al., 2006), to engage in, recognize, share with others, and reason about, simple pretend episodes.

    It is non-heavy-duty, to say the least, to claim that to possess the concept PRETEND is just to be able to engage in, recognize, share with others, and reason about simple pretend episodes. (In fact, one might comment that this is a pretty behavioral description of what it is to possess the concept PRETEND.) But these abilities are precisely what theories of pretense are trying to explain! If this is what it is to possess the concept PRETEND, then of course–by definition alone–no behaviorist theories of pretense can explain how children can recognize pretense without possessing the concept PRETEND. By artificially taking away intuitive implications of what it is to possess and deploy concepts, Friedman and Leslie also seriously rob the force from their central point against behaviorist theories of pretense.

    In the end, I am unconvinced by Friedman and Leslie. To be sure, behaviorist theories of pretense have some legitimate problems, which Friedman and Leslie also raise. However, it seems to me that metarepresentationalist theories have a more pressing problem: developing an adequate notion of what it is to possess and deploy the concept PRETEND.


  • December 11, 02:48 PM

    What does consistency have to do with reasons?

    I asked Allan Gibbard this post’s titular question earlier this year, and he patiently noted that many people value consistency because if one has inconsistent beliefs, one or more of one’s beliefs must be false. I responded that since he and I believe that all normative beliefs are, in some sense, false, this sort of consideration wouldn’t give us — or other anti-realists about value — any reason to want our “ethical beliefs,” whatever form they might take, to be consistent. I can’t remember where the conversation went from there, but I don’t think that he was particularly moved by my response.

    But I was moved by it, and I still am. Sure, if I believe P and not-P, I must have a false belief. But if there aren’t any normative truths, then if I believe P and not-P with respect to some normative matter, I should probably just stop having beliefs of that sort, but if I’m unable to stop (as some anti-realists seem to hold), what harm could follow if I have inconsistent beliefs about such matters?

    I recognize that only certain varieties of “anti-realism” about ethics hold that there are no normative truths. Perhaps Allan’s “quasi-realism” isn’t one of them — I can never keep track of what he does or doesn’t think can be true — which might explain his not being impressed with this line of thought. But if one doesn’t think that there are any truths of the form “X is good,” “X is right,” “X is reasonable,” etc., then it seems one doesn’t have any truth-related reasons to value consistency among one’s normative commitments, beliefs, statements, etc.

    Leaving that aside, here’s another little pseudo-problem: Suppose, like Sharon Street, you hold that “to make a normative judgment is to ‘give laws to oneself.’ As soon as one takes anything whatsoever to be a reason, one thereby ‘legislates’ standards according to which, by one’s own lights as a valuing agent, one is making a mistake, … if one endorses certain other normative judgments.” (This is from Street’s “Constructivism About Reasons,” pp. 229-30.)

    I take Street’s account of reasons and normativity to depend largely on an appeal to internal consistency of some sort. According to Street, one’s judgments about reasons can be judged as “correct” or “incorrect” from the standpoint of all one’s other judgments about reasons. Of course, since Street also holds that there are “ultimately” no normative truths or truths about reasons, I’m inclined to ask why we should continue to make “judgments about reasons” or take ourselves to have reasons if we agree with Street that there are ultimately no truths about these matters. She has an answer to this, of course: We can’t help but occupy the “practical standpoint,” and occupying this standpoint necessarily involves making normative judgments and taking oneself to have reasons. I’m not convinced that she’s right about that, but I’ll grant it for the sake of argument.

    Assuming that we can’t help but occupy the practical standpoint, we’re going to make some judgments about reasons. Let’s say I have previously made a bunch of judgments about reasons, and I now take myself to have reason to make some tea. According to Street, we can determine whether this judgment is correct by comparing it to all my other normative judgments. If it can “withstand scrutiny” from the standpoint of my other normative judgments, it’s correct. I take it that “withstanding scrutiny” largely requires that the normative judgment under inspection not conflict with or be inconsistent with other normative judgments I’ve made.

    Suppose that Street (or someone else, if I’ve got Street wrong) holds that consistency with one’s other normative judgments is at least necessary (and perhaps sufficient) for constructivist “correctness” of a given normative judgment. If so, the view seems to place a high value on consistency, or at least, it takes consistency to be centrally involved in normative matters. (Street argues that the requirement of being consistent with one’s reasons follows analytically from what is involved in “taking oneself to have a reason.”) This strikes me as odd.

    Suppose I take myself to have reason to go pick up my daughter at noon and also take myself to have reason to pick up a book at the library at noon. (My daughter is not at the library.) These judgments about reasons are inconsistent. Of course, unless I have deviant priorities, it’s easy to tell which judgment has to go: I have most reason to pick up my daughter. Indeed, it’s easy to see where I went wrong in the first place. I should have taken myself to have most (or significant, or +5) reason to pick up my daughter and less (or trivial, or +1) reason to pick up the book. These judgments about reasons are not inconsistent, and they allow me to judge both as correct and still pick up my daughter.

    But it seems to me that the reason I should pick up my daughter (if you’ll permit loose talk about “reasons” for a moment) is that I care about her, not that I have taken myself to have reason to pick her up and that this judgment is consistent with my other normative judgments. Contrary to the view I’ve sketched above, which takes consistency among reasons to be centrally important in deciding what you have reason to do, this consideration seems not to matter much at all. At least, it doesn’t matter to me.

    Suppose I had been an awful father until today, in that I previously judged myself to have no reason at all to take care of my daughter. (How could you think that of me!?) Then this morning, like the Grinch, my heart grew three sizes, and I decided that I cared most about my daughter, not my huge stack of checked-out books that I never get around to reading. From the standpoint of my previous normative judgments, this latest normative judgment is quite inconsistent and therefore constructively incorrect. But I don’t care about that; my heart just grew three sizes, I’ve changed my normative priorities, and what I care about now is what matters to me, whether it is consistent with what I used to care about or not.

    There’s probably a constructivist way to explain away this example, e.g., my new normative judgment is of such overwhelming intensity that it swamps the old, one-third-hearted judgments about reasons. But I don’t think that erases the worry I’m trying to motivate. If an account of reasons requires us to accept that consistency among reasons is of central importance, it should be able to explain why it’s so important (assuming, for the moment, that there are truths about what is or isn’t “important”).

    Should I want my reasons to be internally consistent? (What if I don’t care about that?) If I discover that one of my judgments about reasons doesn’t withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of my other normative judgments, do I therefore have reason to revise my judgments in order to be more internally consistent? What if none of my judgments about reasons states or entails that I take myself to have reason to seek or value consistency among my judgments about reasons?

    Street’s answer, I think, might go as follows:

    Constructivism’s “purely formal statements about what is involved in the very attitude of taking something to be a reason …. make no substantive assumptions about what reasons there are; they merely state what is involved in taking something to be a reason in the first place. If someone ‘violates’ them, then she is not making an error; she is merely not taking anything to be a reason. This is similar to the way in which a child who pretends that a pawn is riding a knight is not making a mistake; she is just not playing chess.” (“Constructivism About Reasons,” p. 229.)

    OK, so if I somehow found myself able to stop playing the “reasons game” in which consistency is centrally important, and I started playing another “reasons game” in which what I cared about at any given moment was most important, what could/should I think about my new “normative” practices? Would I be indulging in an impermissibly deviant sense of “reasons” if I described the output of my inconsistent “reasons game” as “reasons”? Would I have reason to stop playing my game and play Street’s game, instead?

    Street is not unaware of these sorts of worries, as readers of her work will know, but I’m unsatisfied by her responses. Since I’m already over 1400 words, I won’t describe her responses here; I’ll leave interested readers to have a look at Street’s responses or provide some of their own. You could also look at the recent exchanges between John Broome and Niko Kolodny — I’ve read some, but not all of it, and I thought it was interesting, but some of the formal stuff went over my head.

    But before you read any of that stuff, please tell me what you think of my abject confusion about normative matters.


  • December 03, 03:48 PM

    Teaching Early Modern

    There has been some very interesting discussions on how to teach an introductory early modern class. My own undergrad experience has been the standard “rationalist vs. empiricist” story line, and some of the improvements suggested sound very interesting. I’m especially pleased to learn that there is an anthology of women philosophers from that period, and wish I had read some of that in my limited exposure to history. Anyway, I thought these links would be of general interest.

    [HT: The Ethical Werewolf]


  • October 04, 08:42 AM

    Prescriptive Metaethics

    By and large, metaethicists have focused on descriptive questions about the nature of our moral discourse. For instance, is it in the business of stating facts, or of expressing affective states? If the former, are there such facts? If the latter, how is this reconciled with the role that moral language plays in reasoning?…

    There is one clear exception. Some who are interested in error theory have shifted their attention from the descriptive question to a prescriptive/ practical one–namely, “Are we to retain moral language? And if so, how are we to treat it?” (I give the practical variant since it might be thought problematic for an error theorist to ask a question framed in terms of “should.”) The reason for this shift is that the prescriptive/practical question seems quite pressing in the case of error theory. Error theory seems to force the question. The two most prominent answers discussed by error theorists, to my (limited) knowledge, are eliminativism and moral fictionalism (of the prescriptive variety).

    Most other descriptive metaethical views do not seem to force the question in the same way. If, say, cognitivist-realism is true, it seems natural to many to accept moral language for what it is, and go about one’s business. The same goes for descriptive expressivism.

    Yet, it strikes me that the prescriptive/practical question is intelligible on any descriptive metaethical view (provided, of course, that the descriptive metaethical story in question leaves room for some kind of divergence from our actual practices). I take it that eliminativism (the view that we should give up moral talk altogether) is a live option on all of the leading descriptive metaethical stories. And I expect that prescriptive expressivism is a live option on all of the leading descriptive metaethical stories. (Granted, some prescriptive views do not seem to be live options for certain descriptive views. Cognitivist-realism and prescriptive moral fictionalism seem incompatible.)

    If it is intelligible to address the prescriptive question no matter what one’s descriptive commitments are, and if prescriptive expressivism can be intelligibly combined with any plausible descriptive view, this opens up an interesting possibility. Perhaps all roads lead to prescriptive expressivism. In other words, perhaps prescriptive expressivism is the leading prescriptive option, irrespective of whether one is a descriptive moral fictionalist, a cognitivist-realist, a descriptive expressivist, an error theorist, an indeterminacy theorist (i.e. one who thinks the semantic story is indeterminate), etc.

    But what is prescriptive expressivism? A rough proposal is this: it is the view that recommends treating ourselves and others as if they are expressing commitments to norms. This, I take it, is something like pretending that we and others are doing this (which is distinct from the prescriptive moral fictionalist’s activity). (Of course, perhaps we don’t need to pretend in our own case. Perhaps, in our own case, we are able to effectively express commitments with our moral talk. I’m not sure and would be interested to hear thoughts about that.)

    That’s all for now. I’m curious to know if there are problems with what I’ve said or if anyone has different ideas about what prescriptive expressivism might involve.

    Later Addition (10/6/09):

    Discussion with Don Loeb has alerted me to what seems an important distinction to make, which I hadn’t been appreciating:

      A self-directed prescriptive metaethical view is a view about how to (or, how one ought to) modify and/or treat one’s own use of normative language.
      An other-directed prescriptive metaethical view is a view about how to (or, how one ought to) treat other people’s use of normative language.

    My talk of “prescriptive expressivism” above was gesturing at a combination of self-directed and other-directed prescriptive expressivism.

    I’d be quite interested to hear people’s thoughts about this distinction.


  • September 24, 12:48 AM

    Bleg: Mental Activities?

    I want to make a distinction between mental activities and mental states.

    As I only have some vague ideas, it is easier to point to some examples. Some examples of mental activities: counterfactual reasoning, doxastic deliberation, planning, daydreaming, dreaming, playing a pretend game. Some examples of mental states: beliefs, desires, imaginings, emotions, perceptions. My sense is that there really is something different about the former cluster compared to the latter. Any suggestions on how that distinction might be made more precise?


  • September 18, 07:14 AM

    Normative Because False!?#

    In what is meant to be  “a contribution of major importance to a unified theory of probability and utility” Jeffrey (The Logic of Decision) says about Bayesian decision theory that

    Indeed, it is because logic and decision theory are woefully inadequate as descriptions that they are of interest as norms. (p.167)

    Now,  here’s a worry I presented yesterday in the seminar and that I’d like to present again, so that other people may consider it and that the ones that heard it can see why it’s worrisome. There are, at least, two questions the claim above prompts:

    1) If theory T is woefully inadequate as a description of phenomena F, and yet it is meant to be a normative theory of F, couldn’t it be that it makes absurd demands about F?

    2) If it is in virtue of theory T’s woeful descriptive inadequacy towards F that T is an interesting normative theory of F, wouldn’t it be the case that false descriptive theories turn out to be interesting normative theories?

    Here are some examples that illustrate both worries. Consider the following theory about human decision making behavior called ‘T1′

    T1: For any subject and any decision D at any time t, subject S should fly up into the sky at time t2 if S reaches decision D at time t1.

    T1 is woefully inadequate as a description of human decision behavior. If we accept Jeffrey’s diagnosis about  Bayesian Decision Theory, it is in virtue of this inadequacy that T1 is an interesting normative theory of decision making! But you may object, of course, that we have independent reasons to reject T1. The demands that it presents just don’t make sense at all! Point taken. But it will not get us out of trouble.

    Consider the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle which seems, to my mind, to offer a very sensible limitation on ANY normative theory: if subject S ought to do X in context C it must be the case that S is able in C to do X. Now suppose that, for some or other reason, whenever humans are in real decision making contexts (e.g., when they are decision where to go for dinner, or whether to watch a movie or do a reading) as opposed to consciously working out in a formal epistemology seminar, they cannot, because of their cognitive architecture, compute an algebra. Decision theory will still claim that humans should distribute their credences over some or other algebra. So it seems that Decision Theory will be claiming that humans ought to do what they cannot do. That seems absurd. Decision Theory should be a bit more informed about human psychology.

    So far so good for the first worry. The second one is just as bad (if not worse). Suppose we accept Jeffrey’s claim that it is precisely because a theory T is woefully inadequate as a description that it is interesting as a normative theory. If so, then we seem to get the following argument:

    P1 Theory T is woefully inadequate as a description of F.

    P2 If T is woefully inadequate as a description of F then T is an interesting normative theory of F.

    C Theory T is an interesting normative theory of F.

    Now consider theories that give woefully inadequate descriptions of the phenomena they intend to theorize about. Here’s a big group of such theories: the false ones. Consider, in particular, Aristotle’s physics and astronomy. They are both woefully inadequate theories of the behavior of physical objects and planets. So we may run the argument:

    P1 Aristotle’s astronomy is woefully inadequate as a theory of the behavior of planets.

    P2 If Aristotle’s astronomy is woefully inadequate as a theory of the behavior of the planets, then it is an interesting normative theory of the behavior of the planets.

    C Aristotle’s theory is an interesting normative theory of the behavior of the planets.

    Now that does seem like a bad result, doesn’t it? That’s why we should worry about Jeffrey’s claim that

    Indeed, it is because logic and decision theory are woefully inadequate as descriptions that they are of interest as norms.

    The fact that a given theory T about phenomena F delivers a woefully inadequate description of F gives no good reason to take it to be an interesting normative theory of F. Jeffrey is simply wrong about this. And if he is right about decision theory being so woefully inadequate, then we should worry a bit about its theoretical value. In general, I think, all normative theories should worry about being so woefully inadequate!


  • August 26, 10:46 AM

    Diagnosis precedes prescription

    The title principle seems obvious enough. Which makes it all the more puzzling that most normative political theorists ignore it in practice. Why is this? What are the implications?

    Let me elaborate. Consider the global poverty literature. Two classes of prescriptions are made here. Examples from the first class — call them “general prescriptions”, for lack of imagination — include:

  • “We (citizens of affluent countries) ought to alleviate global poverty.”
  • “We ought to take care of domestic poverty before dealing with global poverty.”
  • “We ought to work toward a more equal global distribution of wealth.”
  • “We ought to bring people up to some minimum threshold of well-being but no more.”
  • While I think diagnosis of a sort precede these sorts of prescriptions, this might be more controversial then the principle I had in mind when I wrote the title to this post. Anyway, these aren’t the sorts of prescriptions referred to in the title.

    Call the second class of prescriptions “specific prescriptions” (again, for lack of imagination). Examples include:

  • “We ought to donate more money to NGOs who are working to alleviate global poverty.”
  • “We (our governments) ought to give more development assistance to poor countries.”
  • “We ought to tax international financial transactions/carbon emissions/sales of resources extracted from the global commons and use to revenue to finance development in poor countries.”
  • “We ought to make international trade fairer by, e.g., abolishing agricultural and industrial subsidies in developed countries.”
  • It’s this second class of prescriptions that I’m interested in. It’s this second class of prescriptions that must be preceded by diagnosis.

    Diagnosis is the practice of explaining an outcome by identifying the causal process generating it. The sort of diagnosis with which many of us are most familiar is medical diagnosis. The aim of medical diagnosis is to identify the causal process producing the medical abnormality. Most obviously, this requires finding a causal process that can explain the medical symptoms. But (as any dutiful viewer of House will know), the symptoms aren’t the only relevant data points. The symptoms that are absent can be just as informative as the symptoms that are present. The point is this: medical diagnosticians seeks to identify the causal process generating the data so that they can identify the places in the causal chain where intervention is most likely to be effective, as well as identify the intervention possibilities most likely to be successful.

    Similarly, one would think that identifying the causal process generating problematic social outcomes we observe — like global poverty — would be a key step in the task of proposing intervention. Once we’ve identified our general duties — suppose we have an obligation to alleviate global poverty — it would be helpful to know what causes global poverty so that we can figure out how to most effectively discharge our general duties. Indeed, the point seems obvious and is likely obvious to most political philosophers. Yet, the practice of political philosophers shows, at worst, a startling disregard for the importance of the diagnostic task, at best, a naïveté about what is required of a diagnosis.

    To avoid making this too long, I’ll give an example of each sort of flaw and say a few things about what is required of a diagnosis. The examples:

    Peter Singer has, for nearly 40 years, been a prominent advocate of charitable donations to NGOs. Specifically, he recommends that residents of affluent countries give a modest percentage of their income to aid organizations according to a sliding scale based on income. (See ch. 10 of Singer 2009 for details.) This prescription is motivated by Singer’s oft-cited “drowning child” thought experiment: You’re on your way to an important meeting wearing a nice suit and shoes; you see a child drowning in a shallow pond; the child’s life is vastly more important than your suit and shoes; you ought to wade into the pond and save the child.

    A key feature of Singer’s motivating thought experiment is the absence of background context. Most importantly, we don’t know how the child came to be drowning in the pond in the first place. Such information might be unnecessary when determining whether we should wade into the pond to pull out the child because it doesn’t matter how the child got there; it’s immediately obvious that the way to save the child is to pull her out of the pond. But global poverty is not nearly so easy to figure out. And this is where the analogy to the drowning child breaks down. The drowning child scenario is an emergency; most cases of global poverty are chronic. Emergencies are relatively easy to solve: if possible, remove the immediate threat. Chronic cases are much more difficult to solve. They’re like weeds in a garden: to prevent them from coming back, we need to pull them out by the roots. Thus, if we are to figure out how to prevent global poverty, it matters how people became impoverished. Singer’s failure to recognize this means he is effectively shooting first and aiming later (if at all) with his prescriptions. Sure, some might hit, but this seems a terribly ineffective way of treating an illness.

    Leif Wenar (2008) proposes that we alleviate global poverty by enforcing international property rules. Affluent countries should cease importing resources (such as oil and mining products) from corrupt and authoritarian rulers (who have no legal right to sell these resources without their constituents’ consent), place tariffs on imports from countries who purchase resources from such states (as, e.g., China does from Sudan), and place the revenue generated by the tariffs in a “Clean Hands” trust fund, whose contents are to be returned to the citizens of states like Sudan once they establish a democratic government. Wenar’s proposal is based on the following diagnosis of global poverty. Social scientists have noted a correlation between natural resource abundance and negative development outcomes (the so-called “resource curse”). This correlation seems to be explained by three “causal pathways”: authoritarianism, increased civil war incidence, and low economic growth rates. Each of these are statistically correlated with both resource abundance and negative development outcomes. Thus, according to Wenar, if we can break the connection between resource abundance on the one hand and authoritarianism, civil war, and low growth on the other, we should be able to break the connection between resource abundance and negative development outcomes. Resource income can then be invested in development and poverty will be overcome in resource abundant countries, which is where a significant percentage of the global poor reside.

    Wenar should be praised for doing his social science homework. But identifying a series of correlations doesn’t amount to an adequate diagnosis. The correlations identified by Wenar aren’t “causal pathways”, so they don’t explain the resource curse. They are simply additional correlations that themselves require explanation. An adequate diagnosis would explain the data; it would identify the causal process that connects resource abundance with authoritarianism, civil war, low growth, and poverty. Wenar’s diagnosis is akin to delineating which symptoms are correlated with which diseases. This can be useful if these correlations lead to further insight about the operative causal processes. The correlations identified by Wenar give only limited such insight. But without this further insight, we’re left treating symptoms.

    I’ve already hinted at what I think counts as an adequate diagnosis. Before we make specific prescriptions about how to best discharge our general duties, we need to identify the causal processes generating the outcomes we seek to address. There are some things to be said here about appropriate engagement with and application of social scientific research, but we can leave further discussion of the details to the comments thread.

    Two further things we can take up in comments:

    First, why do normative theorists neglect the diagnostic task? My guess is that is has something to do with an appeal to some notion of the “appropriate division of labour”, where diagnosis is farmed out to social scientists. I think this is untenable, but we can talk about it.

    Second, what are the implications for philosophers’ proposals of neglecting the diagnostic task? I think it puts us in the position of a blindfolded archer: a desire to shoot but no idea where to aim. Unfortunately, our blindfolds haven’t prevented us from shooting. Not surprisingly, this dramatically reduces the chances of making effective prescriptions.